


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# A Process Modeling Framework for Formal Validation of Panama Canal System Operations


Mark Austin and John Johnson,  
Department of Civil Engineering and ISR,  
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.



## Outline





- Motivation
- Early Validation of Systems
- Automated Composition of Process Models
- LTSA
- Lockset Process Model
- Model Checking
- Conclusions/Future Work



## Motivation

The Panama Canal has been operational since 1914.






## Motivation

Left: Congestion in the Miraflores lock and lake.

Right: Limitations of present-day canal capacity...









## Motivation

The Panama Canal is currently undergoing a US \$5.25 billion renovation.



Cross section of water saving basins and a laterally filled lock chamber





# SE Education at UMCP




Industrial-Age Systems	Information-Age Systems
Small, simple, Linear	Large, complex, nonlinear
Systems of Components	System of systems
Dominated by hardware	Combinations of hardware, software and communications

Many present-day systems are limited in their situation awareness and ability to look ahead and predict events.







# Early Validation of Systems




Traditional Approach to Airport Design and Test.



# Composition of Models







## What is LTSA?




The labeled transition system analyzer (LTSA) is...


**verification tool for concurrent systems. It mechanically checks that the specification of a concurrent system satisfies the properties required of its behavior.**


It is particularly suitable for high-level modeling and verification of systems dominated by processes that have concurrent behaviors, including interaction with other processes.

LTSA supports specification animation to facilitate interactive exploration of system behavior.



# Working with LTSA







## Model Formulation



# From requirements to architectures....





# A Simple Example

## Two friends talk over coffee .....

```

Terminal — tcsh — 70x27
/Users/austin/ltsa3.0/Austin 277>> more conversation.lts
// =====
// Jack and Diane have conversation over coffee ....
// =====

// Create a person who: (1) talks and drinks coffee, or
//                      (2) just waits and then drinks coffee ....

PERSON = ( talk -> drink -> PERSON
           | wait -> drink -> PERSON ).

// Jack and Diane meet ....

||JACK_AND_DIANE_MEET = ( jack:PERSON || diane:PERSON ).

// To learn, conversation needs to be two way ....


TWO_WAY = ( jack.talk -> diane.talk -> TWO_WAY ).


// Conversation should be polite ....

||JACK_AND_DIANE_LEARN = ( JACK_AND_DIANE_MEET || TWO_WAY ) / {
    jack.talk/diane.wait, diane.talk/jack.wait }.


// =====
// End!
/Users/austin/ltsa3.0/Austin 278>>


```






# Jack and Diane Talk!!






# Framework for Model Development









# Lockset Process Model



## Lock System Architecture




## Component-level Processes




[1..NoShips].(east:SHIPS)

GATESYSTEM and PUMPSYSTEM processes


## Lockset-Level Processes






# Component Processes

## Basic Processes In Canal Model







# Scheduler Design

East-Bound Traffic


West-Bound Traffic




Scheduler Process Model



Current Traffic Direction



Water Level



# Scheduler Design



```
Terminal — vim — 93x22

SCHEDULER = SCHEDULER[0][0][East][Low],
SCHEDULER[we:0..NoShips][ww:0..NoShips][td:TrafficDirection][wl:WaterLevel] = (


    // Register requests to transit lock in east- and west-bound directions.

    when ( we <= NoShips ) [S].east.request -> SCHEDULER[we+1][ ww][td][wl]
    | when ( ww <= NoShips ) [S].west.request -> SCHEDULER[ we][ww+1][td][wl]


    // East-bound assignments to ascend the lock system.


    | when ( we >= 1 && td == East && wl == Low ) [i:S].east.acquire ->
        ascend -> [i].east.depart -> SCHEDULER[we-1][ ww][West][wl]
    | when ( ww == 0 && we >= 1 && wl == Low ) [i:S].east.acquire ->
        ascend -> [i].east.depart -> SCHEDULER[we-1][ ww][East][wl]
    | when ( we >= 1 && td == East && wl == High ) [i:S].east.acquire ->
        resetlow -> [i].east.depart -> SCHEDULER[we-1][ ww][West][Low]
    | when ( ww == 0 && we >= 1 && wl == High ) [i:S].east.acquire ->
        resetlow -> [i].east.depart -> SCHEDULER[we-1][ ww][East][Low]

    // West-bound assignments to descend the lock system.
```




# Lockset Behavior






# Model Checking








## Design Properties




We would like to design systems that have properties that are guaranteed to be satisfied.


<b>Safety</b>	A safety property asserts that nothing bad happens..
<b>Liveliness</b>	A liveliness property asserts some good “eventually” happens..
<b>Progress</b>	A progress property asserts that it is always the case that eventually an “action” will be executed..



# Model Checking

In practice the model checking procedure has two steps: (1) unfold the finite state machines into trees, and (2) exhaustively search the tree to see if the property specification is violated.







# Model Checking




## Subsystem-level Process Hierarchies



## Plan View of Networked Processes







# Model Checking


## Sequence of Simplified Process Hierarchies

### Problem 1. Validate Behavior of Subsystem C





### Problem 2. Validate Behavior of Subsystem D





# System Flood Property





## Conclusions



This is a work in progress -- so what's next?

- Models for System-Level Operations (I.e., the Full Canal)
- Sensors, Non-Deterministic Models of Travel Demand
- Use of abstraction to simplify complexity of validation computations

How to systematically simplify the validation of system-level concerns?

